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Extensions of Power Transitions: Applications
to Political Economy
Jacek Kugler
Abstract
This is a paper about theory in political economy terms and political economy in theoretical
terms. It unifies power transition theory and applies it to the central questions that now confront
political economists. Will trade wars emerge as the security challenge declines? What are the
economic effects of integration, trade and growth? How will economic patterns influence inter-
national power relationships? This paper offers a preliminary bridge whereon practitioners and
theorist may meet to assess the challenges that lie at the intersection between politics and eco-
nomics.
The economic collapse and political dissolution of the Soviet Union left policymakers and scholars
searching for new fundamentals about the nature of the international system. During the Cold War
era the supreme threat to international peace and security overshadowed economic concerns. The
nature of that threat was a powerful mobilizing tool for government, business, and society. The
loss of the immediate security threat has forced policymakers to search for explanations which
fit the new international circumstances without violating old, cherished and proven concepts. In
the last 10 years the foreign policy community has gone through a difficult and wrenching exercise.
The sense of uncertainty about the future of the new world stems not just from the radical changes
it has undergone, but equally from the realization that the new environment requires the same level
understanding of the politics of security and the politics of economics.
This paper is designed to accomplish two goals. First, it offers the reader a composite picture
of power transition theory, integrating the various extensions and amplifications into a coherent
whole. It brings together that new research and weaves it into the rich text of the underlying theory.
By providing a systematic outline of the hierarchical relationship among power and satisfaction
we offers a foundation for exploring conflictual and economic interactions in world politics.
EXTENSIONS OF POWER TRANSITIONS:
 APPLICATIONS TO POLITICAL ECONOMY
Jacek Kugler1
Claremont Graduate University
THE SEARCH FOR NEW EXPLANATIONS
This is a paper about theory in political economy terms and political economy in
theoretical terms. It unifies power transition theory and applies it to the central questions that
now confront political economists.  Will trade wars emerge as the security challenge declines?
 What are the economic effects of integration, trade and growth? How will economic patterns
influence international power relationships?  This paper offers a preliminary bridge whereon
practitioners and theorist may meet to assess the challenges that lie at the intersection between
politics and economics.
The economic collapse and political dissolution of the Soviet Union left policymakers
and scholars searching for new fundamentals about the nature of the international system.
During the Cold War era the supreme threat to international peace and security overshadowed
economic concerns.  The nature of that threat was a powerful mobilizing tool for government,
business, and society. The loss of the immediate security threat has forced policymakers to
search for explanations which fit the new international circumstances without violating old,
cherished and proven concepts. In the last 10 years the foreign policy community has gone
through a difficult and wrenching exercise.
The sense of uncertainty about the future of the new world stems not just from the radical
changes it has undergone, but equally from the realization that the new environment requires the
same level understanding of the politics of security and the politics of economics.
This paper is designed to accomplish two goals.  First, it offers the reader a composite
picture of power transition theory, integrating the various extensions and amplifications into a
coherent whole.1   It brings together that new research and weaves it into the rich text of the
underlying theory.  By providing a systematic outline of the hierarchical relationship among
power and satisfaction we offers a foundation for exploring conflictual and economic
interactions in world politics.
1. Theoretical Framework: The Structure of Power Transition
The heart of this section is devoted to the three components of power transition theory:
structure, dynamics, and policy.  The structural aspect of the theory is explored to provide an
understanding of the nature of power and power relationships among nations that lead to war, as
well as accounting for the problems of political economy.
In a theoretical sense, power transition defies traditional typecasting.  It is neither realist
nor idealist, we prefer to call it rationalist.  That is, it is structural, yet dynamic, since it
recognizes that policy interests are at the core of all disputes.  Subject to empirical testing, it
                                                       
1 Paper presents at the Sixth World Peace Science Congress, held May 24-26 1999 at the
Tinbergen Institute in Amsterdam.  Much of this material to be published in Power Transitions
(2000) (Chatham House)  forthcoming.
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2meshes well with objective conclusions flowing from history. It is a theory that lends itself to a
blend of the empirical and policy worlds.
Hierarchies
Power transition theory describes a hierarchical system.  All nations recognize the
presence of this hierarchy and understand their relative position within this power terrain.  The
distribution of power is uneven and concentrated in the hands of a few.  A dominant nation, that
controls the largest proportion of resources within the system, sits at the top (see Figure 1.1).
Yet this nation, despite our description as dominant, is not a hegemon.  It cannot single-handedly
control the actions of other powerful nations, rather it maintains its position as dominant power
by ensuring power preponderance over potential rivals, and by managing the international
system with rules that benefit its allies and satisfy their national aspirations.
Small Powers
Middle Powers
Great Powers
Dominant Power
Figure 1.1.  Classic Power Pyramid
Figure 1.1 shows that great powers reside below the dominant nation, each having a
significant proportion of the power of the leader.  Today the great powers are China, Japan,
Germany or the EU in toto, Russia assuming recovery, and potentially India.  Most great powers
are satisfied with the regime’s rules, share in the allocation of resources and help maintain the
international system.  Occasionally, great powers are dissatisfied, such as China or India today,
and are not fully integrated into the dominant power’s regime. On rare occasion a challenger
arises out of this pool. Challengers are defined as nations that have 80% or more of the dominant
country’s power. China today is the strongest potential challenger to the United States.  In the
future India could also play this role. The EU is satisfied and thus not a potential challenger.
Dissatisfied challengers and their supporters can be the initiators of war unless economic and
political means are applied to alter their course.
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3Beneath the great powers in Figure 1.1 are the middle powers, substantive states of the
size of France, Italy, or Brazil with resources that cannot be dismissed, but with insufficient
power to challenge the dominant power for international control. The largest number of nations
resides farther down the pyramid; those small powers have few resources relative to the middle
and great powers.  They pose no threat to the dominant nation’s leadership of the international
system but can be essential to understand interactions within sub-hierarchies. New research has
shown that relatively independent hierarchies also exist at regional levels.2  Within each region,
South America or the Middle East, regional hierarchies exist with their own sets of dominant
powers, great powers and lesser powers.  These regional hierarchies are influenced by the global
hierarchical system but cannot, in turn, control that larger system. Figure 1.2 reveals the relative
power distributions in the global system and in two regional systems.
Figure 1.2. Hierarchies in the International System
Note that the distribution of power clearly makes the regional hierarchies subordinate to
the international hierarchy.  These regional hierarchies function in the same manner and operate
under the same rules as the international hierarchy. The dominant power in the regional
hierarchy, however, is subordinate to the influences of the dominant power and the great powers
in the international hierarchy that exercise their options within their “spheres of influence”.
POWER
In power transition relative power establishes the precondition for war and peace and
economic disputes.  Power is defined as the ability to impose or persuade an opponent to comply
with demands.3 Power is a combination of the number of people who can work and fight, their
economic productivity and the effectiveness of the political system in extracting and pooling the
3
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4individual contributions to advance national goals. Population alone, however, does not confer
power, as seen by the relative weakness of India, Indonesia, or Brazil - the population also must
be productive. For this reason developed countries have far more influence than their developing
counterparts. But power potential cannot be realized without political capacity, defined as the
ability of governments to extract resources to advance national goals. Politically capable
governments can expand their resources to achieve their goals.  For this reason a politically
capable North Vietnam defeated the more populated, affluent but politically weak South
Vietnam, despite massive help from the US.
SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION*
The motivation driving decisions is satisfaction with the rules of the international or
regional hierarchy. Conflicts are generated by the desire of a nation to improve its political
position in the hierarchy.  Dissatisfied nations challenge the status quo.  Conflict does not occur
when nations are relatively satisfied as they support the existing rules of the international system.
Status quo nations seek cooperative solutions to problems that enhance their economic and
security gains.  Nations at the top of the hierarchy and are more likely to be more satisfied with
those rules than those lower in the international hierarchy.  This should not come as a surprise
since the satisfied great powers set the rules, control most of the wealth, enjoy most of the
prosperity, and wield most of the power in the international system.  For this reason the dominant
power is satisfied, absent open challenges to its dominance.  Indeed, the dominant nation is the
defender of the status quo for it creates and maintains the international or local system, and gains
substantial benefits from its existence.4
The few dissatisfied nations at the top, and the many at the bottom of the hierarchy view
the international system as not conferring benefits equal to their expectations and long term
interests. They consider the international system to be unfair, corrupt, biased, skewed, and
dominated by hostile forces. Their rationale or grievance may be historical (Germany prior to
World Wars I and II), ideological (Soviet Union during cold war), religious (Iran), territorial
(Palestine), personal (Libya), or economic (China). Despite different reasons for their grievances,
dissatisfied nations all view the international status quo as unfavorable. They are dissatisfied with
the established international leadership, its rules and norms. Dissatisfied powers wish change.
Small Powers
Middle Powers
Great Powers
Dominant Power
Dissatisfied
Satisfied
Figure 1.3. Distribution of Satisfaction
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5The few dissatisfied nations at the top, and the many at the bottom of the hierarchy view
the international system as not conferring benefits equal to their expectations and long term
interests.  They consider the international system to be unfair, corrupt, biased, skewed, and
dominated by hostile forces.  Their rationale or grievance may be historical (Germany prior to
World Wars I and II), ideological (Soviet Union during cold war), religious (Iran), territorial
(Palestine), personal (Libya), or economic (China).  Despite different reasons for their
grievances, dissatisfied nations all view the international status quo as unfavorable.  They are
dissatisfied with the established international leadership, its rules and norms. Dissatisfied powers
wish change.
DYNAMICS ECONOMIC GROWTH
The foundation for economic growth described in Figure 1.4 is adapted from current to
future capital accumulation dynamics.  Capital for our purpose is effectively reflected by national
income and measured by gross domestic product per capita. Political capacity, detailed below, is
the ability of governments to extract resources from their populations in order to advance the
policy goals of the government.  Note that nations with limited gross product and low political
capacity may fall into a “poverty trap.” On the other hand, as economic growth starts, prompted
by changes in political capacity, rapid economic growth is achieved. For this reason, empirically
fast rates of output change are concentrated among developing societies. When nations achieve
relatively high levels of capital accumulation and, they maintain political capacity at average
rates, output growth stabilizes and produces sustained growth at moderate levels.
Reinforcing the tenets of power transition, endogenous growth theory refines the
characteristics of the S curve of development proposed by Organski. 5 Endogenous growth theory
shows that the technological revolution combined with political changes will help developed
societies maintain steady growth rates, but will not allow them to hold off rapidly developing
countries. The dynamics of endogenous growth suggest that the distribution of capital and labor
across societies will force output convergence. As figure 1.4 shows societies with relatively low
rates of per capita output will, if they avoid the poverty trap, enjoy higher growth rate than their
richer counterparts. Thus, convergence anticipates that power transitions will occur as long as
relatively large global and regional populations are poor, but when all societies attain sustained
economic growth, power transitions will cease.
Note that countries with different levels of political capacity are expected to have different
growth trajectories. Countries are either headed into a “poverty trap” (the southwest corner of the
figure) or toward sustained economic growth (the northeast corner of the figure). For the path
that leads to a poverty trap, political capacity and initial physical or human capital is sufficiently
low so that the economy will be caught in a low-income developmental trajectory. That is, when
there is a paucity of physical and human capital, birth rates will be so high that human capital
decumulates over generations. As a result, output will contract.6  Nations with high political
capacity should grow rapidly and achieve sustained growth earlier than low political capacity
nations who flirt with the possibility of falling into the poverty trap.
Power transition shows that the shifts in power associated with such dynamics have serious
consequences for stability. The dynamics of national power growth cannot be changed
dramatically by international interventions. Over the long-term, political factors prompt changes
in physical and human capital driven by technology, and lead to economic convergence in per
capita terms. Challengers with high growth rates will rise in the international system due to the
5
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6dynamics of convergence. The high differential in per capita GDP, for example, between the US
and China is a temporary condition which today accounts for the substantial power advantage of
the US over China. In the future, expected US annual economic growth rates will compare
poorly with those of China. 2  Short of partition, China will become the world’s largest economy.
The EU should also overtake the United States. An overtaking can produce war when the
contenders are dissatisfied (as is China today) or peace when the contenders are satisfied (as is
the EU today)  but overtakings always changes the structure of the hierarchy.
High Political Capacity
Trajectory
45°
Low Political Capacity
Trajectory
Poverty Trap
Transitional
Growth
Dynamics
Balanced
Growth
Current Gross Domestic Product
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Figure 1.4. The Endogenous Growth Trajectory of National Capabilities3
POLITICAL CAPACITY
The final component of national power is relative political capacity.  Remembering that
relative political capacity is the ability of governments to extract resources from their
populations in order to advance the goals of the government, the following question is which
countries will translate their economic vitality into national power?  Focusing on the S curve
above, let us examine the possibilities.
                                                       
2 Maddison (OECD) 1998.
3Adapted from Kugler, Zak and Feng (1998)
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7Countries at the bottom of the S curve with low levels of economic development have
difficulty extracting resources from their populations, since individuals consume most if not all
resources in daily existence.  As nations develop, however, it does not necessarily follow that
power increases either directly or proportionally.  Among low and early growing nations on the S
curve, there is substantial variation in national ability to extract resources.  Nations with strong
political controls have leverage and can mobilize potential population resources into actual
national power.  The Vietnam war provides a good example of the differences between potential
and actual power.  By virtue of effective political controls, North Vietnam extracted a higher
proportion of resources from a lower base during the conflict. South Vietnam, with weak
political controls yet a more robust economic base, could not.  Even substantial US assistance
and direct military intervention in support of South Vietnamese could not right this imbalance.7
For countries with large populations and improving productivity on the steep portion of
the S Curve, relative political capacity becomes the crucial variable for the creation of power.
For example, should India with a population of perhaps 900 million increase its per capita
productivity and then efficiently extract resources from its population, it would be on a trajectory
to dominate all other nations in its subcontinent regional hierarchy and eventually challenge
international leadership should it so desire. On the other hand, if Iraq, were to undergo economic
modernization and increase productivity, that nation can only aspire to challenge for dominance
in its regional hierarchy due to the relatively small Iraqi population.
Countries at the top of the S curve have mobilized most of the population and economic
resources in their society and face increased costs for any marginal addition.  It is physically
impossible, for example to double the extraction of resources in Sweden when the government
already takes more than half of the available gross domestic product.  Subsequently, these mature
societies expand slowly both in economic and political development due in large part to
technological advances. The lens of power transition allows one to see that political and
economic changes are inescapably linked and always have been.
ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS
Power transition bridges the gulf between traditional national security practitioners, who
view economic factors as relatively unimportant, and economic theorists, who concentrate on
economic trends to the exclusion of political dynamics.8 Power transition recognizes no
distinction between security and economics. The status quo is defined by the dominant nation’s
assertion of its preferences on the security and economic relations with potential challengers. For
both the security and economic dimensions, the dominant power as well as challengers will
approach each other cooperatively or non-cooperatively, depending on their degree of
satisfaction with the status quo and the distribution of power in the international system.
From a policy perspective, cooperative and competitive dyadic relations guide both
economic and political interactions. If the competitors support the status quo, then disputes are
resolved with the dominant nation generally following a cooperative strategy. If opponents
challenge the status quo, then the dominant nation tends to prefer a competitive strategy,
frequently producing confrontational situations that may lead to war. The political and economic
arenas are not two different worlds that must be described by alternate theories. Instead, elites
choose alternate negotiating postures in response to perceived differences in geostrategic
conditions.
7
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8Policy analysts argue that economic interactions that concentrate on maximizing
cooperative relations are fundamentally distinct from political interactions that emphasize
competitive relations.9 The classic illustration of the cooperative relation’s principle is profit.
Businesses, seeking to maximize their net present value, often pursue cooperative relations.
Every dollar added to the bottom line increases profit. Year-end sales of cars illustrate this
principle. Since so much economic analysis concentrates on profit, there is a mistaken belief that
cooperative relations are the sole objective of all economic phenomena.10 Businesses, however,
sometimes foster competitive relations. When two firms compete over market share, their
purpose is to dominate an existing market and obtain more profit in the long-term. The Boeing-
Airbus competition, for example, is not over profits but control of that market. Similarly, the
Microsoft-Netscape competition is over control of the emerging Internet market, and not over
immediate profits from this technology. Thus, depending on circumstances, business leaders
select either a cooperative or competitive strategy. 11
A theory that accounts for political and economic interactions must consider the full
range of options both at the economic and political levels. Unlike more traditional approaches,
power transition’s rejection of the assumption of anarchy in political interactions opens the door
for consistent analysis of both political and economic phenomena from a single, general
perspective, using the status quo as a reference point.
STATUS QUO AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Power transition postulates that status quo nations will overwhelmingly use a cooperative
strategy. Recall that the rules of the international system closely reflect the preferences of
satisfied, powerful nations, which in turn select strategies to strengthen their national goals and
objectives. Direct challenges among such actors are rare and war is unlikely. Dissatisfied nations,
on the other hand, wish to change the status quo, and will aggressively seek to modify the
structure of relations in the international arena when provided the opportunity. Thus, dissatisfied
nations use non-cooperative strategy to weaken opponents. In interactions between satisfied and
dissatisfied actors, and among the dissatisfied actors, attempts to use a non-cooperative strategy
to overtake a satisfied defender of the status quo are common, and thus war is possible.
Power transition postulates that bargaining postures reflect the degree of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction within a dyad of nations. Economic and security interactions, then, are not distinct
and alternate states of the international system. 12 There is a distinction of degree rather than kind
between economic interdependence—as exemplified by relations between Canada and the US, or
among European Union (EU) members—and confrontational interactions—as characterized by
Soviet-American relations during the Cold War or the current Arab-Israeli relations. These are
simply examples of cooperative relations where conflict is rare and non-cooperative interactions
where conflict is frequent. Either strategy can characterize political or economic bargaining.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the relationship between the joint satisfaction of two countries and
the degree of cooperation. The horizontal axis reflects the degree of joint satisfaction of a
challenger and defender, where the defender is always satisfied with the international status
quo,13 while the challenger’s satisfaction varies.14 The vertical axis reflects the degree of
cooperation present in their relations, ranging from extreme non-cooperation to perfect
cooperation. The indifference curve illustrates the relationship between these factors as
suggested by power transition theory.
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Figure 1.5. Maximizing Cooperative and Competitive Dyadic Relations
Economic interactions among satisfied nations, including such issues as trade and capital
flows, are generally resolved cooperatively. 15 Note in Figure 1.5 that Canada and the US
considered a jointly satisfied dyad exhibit an extremely cooperative relationship. The European
Union’s interaction with the US is only slightly less satisfied, and thus relations are slightly less
cooperative. The overriding goal of nations attempting to cooperate is to reach agreements that
strengthen their partnerships without losses to the individual nations.
By contrast, non-cooperative strategies take on a different form. In Figure 1.5, the Arab-
Israeli example is considered non-cooperative, reflecting the Israeli satisfaction with the regional
status quo compared with Arab dissatisfaction, producing the non-cooperative element to their
relations. The US-USSR Cold War relations are an even more dramatic example. The aim was to
alter the policy of each other, to weaken or change their domestic regimes, and to impose biased
international rules on the challenger.
Let us complicate this picture somewhat by jointly considering security and economic
concerns. Modern mercantilists treat competitive relations as the goal of all foreign policy elites.
They argue that the need to defend international primacy and maximize gains dominates all
policy-making concerns.16 An alternative view suggests that foreign policy practitioners follow a
mixed strategy that combines conflictual and cooperative interactions. Power transition suggests
that the unified view of these differing motivations is an effective representation of policy
choices.
Figure 1.6 presents a picture of power transition’s characterization of policy choices for
both economic and security concerns. The vertical axis again places the degree of cooperation
along a continuum. At one end are extremely non-cooperative policies, when nations select
strategies that provide maximum benefits for themselves while minimizing the benefits accrued
by opponents. Thus they will enter into agreements that provide proportionally more to them
than to opponents. As generally anticipated, challengers will not enter into agreements when the
defender gains more.17
At the other end of the continuum, cooperative relations describe a foreign policy stance
where the nation seeks to cooperate, producing the largest joint benefits. Under cooperation,
9
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agreements are possible even if one side gains more relative to the other. Nations will not enter
into agreements that result in absolute losses.
The horizontal axis again places the joint evaluation of the status quo along a continuum
ranging from dissatisfaction to satisfaction. The relationship between cooperation and conflict in
security and economics differs, and is nonlinear. In general, satisfied nations cooperate with
opponents because they are less concerned with improving their relative position than in
accruing joint gains. In relations with dissatisfied nations, satisfied nations are concerned with
the relative power that can be augmented by security or economic exchanges.
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Figure 1.6. Economic versus Security Concerns
While Figure 1.6 focuses on economic interactions, Figure 1.6 illustrate how security
interactions also follow these alternate paths. Members of NATO are generally cooperative in
their interactions with each other. In order to maintain stability in the Western World during the
Cold War, for example, the United States subsidized the military preparedness of Europe,
creating a “free rider” situation where allies can take advantage of each other in the short-term. 18
The US adopted similar principles towards nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons were given to
England and technological transfers helped France and Israel’s nuclear programs.19 Status quo
nations are cooperative in both economic and security interactions. Equivalent actions by
challengers of the status quo are competitive. The United States and the USSR undertook large
arms buildups during the Cold War, and under President Reagan’s leadership the US kept
military expenditures high despite overwhelming military superiority to press for the USSR’s
political transformation. Similarly, nuclear weapons acquisition by Russia and then China
generated recrimination and technological restrictions. Military aid was frequently provided in
reaction to the USSR or China’s interventions rather than in support of like-minded regimes. The
aim here is to force opponents to change policies. Either policy will change—as exemplified by
10
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the change in relations between the US and Russia following the USSR’s collapse—or conflict
may persist and escalate if change is not achieved—as exemplified by the continued tensions
between the US and Cuba.
Figure 1.6 shows how the security shifts between economic and security considerations
reflect the difference in interactions between cooperating and non-cooperating nations. Security
is a primary concern among opponents, while economics dominates interactions between allies.
Note that the security shifts differ along the joint satisfaction dimension. Indeed, the relations
between the US and USSR during the Cold War starting with 1950 were extremely chilly along
security dimensions, while trade interactions were generally not as overtly hostile. Thus,
economic concerns are less critical than security concerns for nations that are dissatisfied.
Notice that as Russia’s relationship with the United States changed following the collapse
of the USSR in 1989, the gap between security and economic concerns widened. Economic
interactions became mildly cooperative while security considerations remained non-cooperative,
but at a much less intense level. If Russia’s satisfaction with the status quo improves, then even
more cooperation is forthcoming. Policy makers have recognized the importance of this
transition by allocating large amounts of resources with the intention of working with Russian
leaders toward further cooperation. However, the ultimate outcome does not depend on the
outside world as much as on the ability of Russian leaders to resolve their economic difficulties.
Among satisfied nations, on the other hand, the relationship is reversed. The security
relations between the EU and the US are still anchored firmly by NATO, but economic disputes
may become more competitive. For example, the most recent economic dispute revolves around
banana exports. Similar concerns can emerge if the value of the Euro is kept artificially low. The
EU and the United States compete more in the economic arena despite consistent joint security
concerns. The implication is that once security concerns are resolved, economic concerns remain
conflictual but are eventually resolved in a cooperative manner. Power transition indicates that
economic disagreements among satisfied nations involve that involve economic exchanges do
not escalate to war. The difference between economic and security concerns is simply a matter of
intensity of preferences. These are not high and low politics, just politics.
A major departure from the conventional wisdom is that a dominant nation, such as the
US, should not view satisfied nations as potential challengers.20 Indeed, following the collapse of
the USSR, many academics and some policy makers argued that Japan would challenge the
United States for international hegemony. Similar concerns preceded and followed German
unification. 21 Power transition argues that this is a dangerous misunderstanding of the power
dynamics in world politics. Given demographic change and the pattern of economic growth,
Japan can no longer challenge the United States. The same is true for Germany. Even though a
reunified Germany is the dominant power within the EU, it cannot become the preeminent power
of the 21st Century. A very similar argument applies to Russia. Challenges to the US dominance,
given current alliances, can only come from Asia.
Thus far, the economic implications of power transition have been explored far less than
the security implications. Yet the power transition perspective provides a general road map for
the realm of political economy, as it does for security. The rest of this paper concentrates on
areas where power transition provides insights that frequently challenge current policy. This
paper discusses the implications for integration as well as international trade, foreign aid,
monetary policy, labor policy, and technological transfers. The intent is to motivate policy
attention and additional research in this important interaction between politics and economics.
11
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ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
The power transition perspective suggests that the degree of cooperation in economic
policies—in particular trade, aid, monetary policy, labor policies and technology transfers—is
related to the level of satisfaction between a challenger and dominant country. Nations that
support the status quo generally will follow a cooperative strategy when their partners are also
status quo nations. They will assume a competitive strategy or even total exclusion when the
recipients challenge the status quo. The argument is not that trade, aid, and technology follow the
flag, but that geostrategic circumstances and the potential impact of such interactions on the
dynamics of growth drives these decisions.
TRADE
Political analysts repeatedly note that the dominant nation invests political capital to
create and encourage a free trade regime. Yet such actions do not maximize the competitive
economic advantage of dominant and large nations.22 Similarly, dominant nations engage in aid
transfers that frequently strengthen potential competitors or nations that do not share common
values. Such actions run contrary to the notion of anarchy, where the objective would be to
utilize competition in the international system to ensure national sovereignty. Power transition
accounts for both competitive and cooperative strategies, providing a framework that helps sort
out the political motivations of actors that pursue seemingly inconsistent policies in their trading
relations.
Figure 1.7 . The Dynamics of International Trade and Monetary Policy
Figure 1.7 compares the relationship between trade policies and monetary policies within
the power transition framework. Between jointly satisfied nations, complete satisfaction implies
free trade, yet trade is restricted much sooner than monetary policy. For example, even though
Japan and the US were both satisfied in the 1980’s, they adopted a trade policy with restrictions
toward each other. Monetary policies, on the other hand, tend not to be as overtly competitive.
As the challenger becomes more dissatisfied in each case, a non-cooperative strategy is taken
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(more restrictions are imposed, as suggested by the boxes of the figure). Note, however, that
trade policy rarely becomes so competitive that complete restriction of trade is imposed.
As the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified, trade
between both superpowers and non-aligned countries increased.23 Congruent with expectations
of the Power Transition, when competing nations are threatened by the proximity of great power
parity, they will adopt a cooperative attitude towards trade with their allies. The defender offers
generous trade policies to consolidate its political position with nations wavering between
satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the status quo. As nations are farther from parity, the
immediacy of the security threat decreases and the defender can shift more toward a competitive
strategy. The Soviet Union’s actions in the Middle East during the Cold War are consistent with
this logic. During the Cold War, trade subsidies and foreign assistance were provided in response
to geopolitical necessities. With the reduction of systemic tensions, foreign assistance declined
and reciprocal trade was increased.24
Political analysts repeatedly note that the dominant nation invests political capital to
create and encourage a free trade regime.25 Yet such actions are not necessarily optimal for the
largest nations. Similarly, dominant nations engage in aid transfers that frequently strengthen
potential competitors or nations that do not share common values. Again such actions run
contrary to the notion of anarchy, where the objective would be to maximize relative status in the
international system and ensure national sovereignty. Power transition provides a framework that
helps sort out the political motivations of these seemingly inconsistent actions.
Unlike the classical benevolent view of free trade, neoclassical economic research shows
that large nations have incentives to use optimal tariffs to restrict trade. While small nations
benefit from specialization to gain competitive advantage in a free trade environment,
specialization provides no trade advantage to large economies. Economies as large as the United
States or the EU begins to approximate the world market in resilience,26 and can impose tariffs
with much less cost than small countries as part of a competitive strategy. On the other hand,
since small countries lack market diversification, they fair best under free trade when they
specialize in areas where they hold a comparative advantage.
In world politics, however, large dominant nations advocate free trade while small ones
frequently resist such advances. Utilizing a competitive strategy, large nations should restrict
trade through optimal tariffs. Empirically, the opposite prevails, particularly in the case of
dominant nations. The United States in the latter half of the 20th century and Britain in the first
half of the 19th century generally supported free trade.27 After Word War II, the United States
encouraged the creation of the IMF, whose sole purpose is to provide a loan and credit system to
facilitate international trade. The Word Trade Organization, the successor to GATT, is an
institution devoted to minimizing trade barriers and standardizing trade transactions.
Participation in such organizations and encouragement of their regulatory role deprives Great
Powers in general, and the dominant nation in particular, of the ability to utilize superior political
and military capabilities to advance trade objectives.
This unexpected economic behavior of Great Powers is consistent with power transition.
The US accepts cooperation in trade transactions with allies because such policies foster support
for a status quo. Indeed, the United States accepted trade restrictions imposed by Germany and
Japan—the largest global exporters—during the Cold War to strengthen the coalition pitted
against the USSR. After the collapse of the USSR, cooperation was abandoned in favor of a
more mixed strategy, but the US still did not revert to pure competition.28 Political considerations
directly affect the willingness of nations to subsidize others. Recall that the US confronted Japan
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and the EU over trade barriers. Despite meek attempts to do so in the past, after 1989 the United
States actively sought to restructure trade agreements with Japan because there was no longer the
need to accommodate in order to maintain a strong anti-Soviet alliance. Policy negotiators during
the Bush and Clinton administrations advocated a more even playing field with the intent of
reducing and eventually eliminating trade deficits. US policymakers did not advance the notion
of recuperating past losses or generating trade surpluses similar to those of Japan. Instead,
“evening the terms of trade” became the objective.
The dominant nation uses trade and aid to incorporate potential competitors into the
status quo. From the Power Transition perspective, the policy of economic engagement towards
China is effective. This stance, started under President Nixon, extended under President Bush,
and further enlarged by the Clinton Administration, is an appropriate choice to avoid a hostile
competitor down the road. Trade policy is one tool that can be used to shift the preferences of
dissatisfied nations from confrontation toward cooperation. If the US is able to co-opt China into
satisfaction with international status quo by using policies such as the Most Favored Nation
(MFN) trading status, by supporting its entry into the WTO, and creating incentives to expand
market forces.  If such actions are successful a major challenger within the power hierarchy
could come to support the international order. Similarly, the financial support provided Russia
following the collapse of communism is consistent with the expectations of power transition.
LABOR MOBILITY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS
Policies affecting the mobility of labor and restrictions on the transfer of technology vary
in similar ways to trade and aid. Figure 1.8 compares the degree of cooperation given different
distributions of satisfaction in labor policies and policies over technological transfers. As
illustrated in Figure 1.8, the mobility of labor is mildly restricted even between jointly satisfied
countries. For example, immigration policies in the US apply broadly to satisfied allies and
dissatisfied nations. Indeed, most nations try to keep their own high-skilled labor at home and
exclude other nations’ low-skilled labor. The EU is unique because it allows labor to move freely
across borders, but domestic restrictions apply as labor migration is minimal compared to that
within the United States. Simply put, political restrictions are applied far more to labor than any
other economic factor. Technological transfers have a similar relationship among the satisfied
and dissatisfied powers. Extreme dissatisfaction leads to acute non-cooperation. Technology is
shared quite freely between friends and even mild competitors.
Any nation with sophisticated technology can transfer some of that knowledge to
enhance the rate of development in another country. However, high technology transfers
frequently generate security externalities.29 Even when no direct security issues can be identified,
transfers of technology can accelerate the potential growth of the recipient. When the transfers
are made from a high technology nation such as the United States to low technology nations such
as China, this effect is magnified. Recall from Figure 1.8 that between jointly satisfied countries,
technology is shared freely. Minimal restrictions persist even when the challenger is slightly
dissatisfied, but once this dissatisfaction becomes more pronounced, the restrictions on
technology increase quickly.
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Figure 1.8. The Dynamics of Labor Mobility and Technology Transfers
As in the case of trade, the choice of how to approach technological transfers depends on
the perception of elites regarding the degree of cooperation between potential recipients. If elites
conclude that leaders of the recipient nation are satisfied, a cooperative relationship should
emerge and restrictions will be limited by commercial competition. If they conclude that
recipients may eventually challenge, then a competitive relationship should emerge. Indeed, the
United States imposed severe restrictions on the export of technology to the USSR and other
CMEA countries during the Cold War to avoid security externalities by the transfer of
technology with dual use. Evidence suggests that such actions delayed the technological
advancements in the restricted areas but did not thwart them. 30 Applying technological sanctions
to dissatisfied nations is reasonable.31 However, such sanctions are contrary to the interests of
individual firms within one’s own nation that wish to expand to foreign markets. Absent a
consensus between domestic coalitions within status quo nations, preservation of technological
restrictions is problematic. Restrictions on technology were relatively successful during the Cold
War when members of the dominant coalition—including Germany, France, Italy, Britain and
Japan—concurred. However, after a thaw in relations occurred during the détente period, Europe
and Japan have no longer consistently complied, and effectiveness of such sanctions has
diminished.32 Such problems escalate when there is no agreement among status quo nations
about the future. Effective policies to co-opt the dissatisfied are doomed if one member of the
Western coalition believes that Russia and China pursue a protracted strategy to weaken the
dominant nation and its allies, while the other contends they wish to join the existing status quo.
A case in point is the provision of missile guidance technology to China. Both sides agree
that such transfers improve the launch reliability of communication satellites. The same
technology can be adopted to improve warhead delivery vehicles. If one adopts the view that
China is moving towards the status quo, a cooperative strategy is preferable. If the technology
had been denied, launch failure would persist—reducing gains for both parties.33 Indeed, the
provision of improved guidance systems diminished the costs for American telecommunication
groups, increases their competitiveness in the global information market, and ensures that US
technology will be utilized in future launches. Furthermore, to prevent failure, China would no
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doubt seek similar technology elsewhere. Russia and Sweden are likely targets because they can
provide a very effective guidance systems at low cost. On the other hand, if one anticipates that
China is not moving towards the status quo, the answer is to adopt a competitive strategy. From
this viewpoint the provision of guidance technology is a serious problem.
First, guidance transfers improve the commercial viability of China’s low priced
launchers, and reduce US opportunities to compete effectively in this area. Moreover, the
security danger to the United States and regional stability is intensified, as effective guidance
systems can easily be adapted to improve ICBM accuracy. These positive and negative
assessments are derived from similar geostrategic considerations. Policymakers should base
them not on technical grounds or political assessments, but on the expectations of future
behavior given changes in the power hierarchy. Here the shadow of the future should drive
current policy.
From the power transition perspective, policies that affect technical transfers involve risk.
Outcomes are preconditioned by geostrategic conditions, but decision makers evaluate the future
of economic dynamics and changes in the status quo before final decisions are made. If a risk is
to be taken, it should be taken in favor of creating stability. Confronting China or Russia is
unlikely to produce a stable international system while co-opting these nations may produce a
lasting peace. Since the US and China will approach parity in the future, a policy that builds trust
in the status quo is required to achieve peace. The alternative is a policy that leads to the collapse
of the challenging government and fragmentation of China. This second option was successful
during the Cold War, but has no assurance of success in the future. Failure can lead to war.
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Economic growth conditions the political dynamics that lead to war. Peace is ensured
when cooperation persists despite power transitions. In world politics, then, the dynamics of
economic change lead to challenges against the status quo only if nations are dissatisfied. The
dominant nation and key members of the international system have an overriding interest in
ensuring that long term economic growth persists at the regional and global level and that the
international status quo is preserved.34
The policy objective is to encourage economic and political congruence. Economic
growth by itself is not the sole policy goal. World Bank stabilization programs reinforce market
economies and encourage political structures congruent with those adopted by the dominant
nation. The international status quo set up by the United States supports market competition,
encourages the adoption of strong property rights, the application of consistent patent rules, and
insists on repatriation of profits. In addition, the United States explicitly advances democratic
principles and fosters human rights. Preservation of the international fiscal and trade regimes to
achieve market economies and extend economic growth goes hand in hand with the evolution of
democratic principles. Political and economic convergence is desirable to preserve systemic
stability.
Let us consider first the economic dynamics that underlie challenges to the status quo’s
stability. Despite its desire to ensure growth for status quo members, the dominant nation cannot
maintain prosperity for all. Nevertheless, the resources and policy instruments of the
international status quo should be used to encourage growth where possible. A stable economic
environment can go a long way toward accomplishing this goal. Following World War II, the
Marshall Plan was instituted to help Western Europe and Japan recover from war, avoiding the
repetition of fiscal failures that followed in the wake of World War I.
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Power transition provides a unique perspective on growth. Recall that the hierarchy of
power is altered by dynamic changes in economic performance.35 The international status quo
can only be preserved in the long term if other nations agree to its structure, and in turn preserve
it. The reason the US overtook Britain without bloodshed in the 19th century is that both nations
shared similar principles and had close economic ties. As one democratic system overtook the
other, the leaders in these nations chose not to fight and instead forged a special relationship that
still persists.
The relative size of a dominant nation imposes natural limits on the duration of a status
quo. With a population of under 50 million, Britain could not maintain dominance over nations
the size of Russia or the United States (with populations over 200 million), and these nations, in
turn, cannot expect to lead China or India, which have populations of a billion or more. The
reason for dominance at different periods in history is based on variations in the rate at which
nations develop. Earlier development by some nations provided them with a temporary, but
fundamentally short-term, preponderance. As economic convergence diminishes the differences
in productivity across nations, challenges to the status quo leadership will emerge. The primary
question is not whether the conditions for such challenges will occur, but whether they can be
resolved and what the outcome of a conflict might be.
From the perspective of power transition, a dominant nation that successfully co-opts
potential challengers to preserve the existing status quo also ensures that the international status
quo will be preserved. Economic growth, however, is not determined primarily by foreign policy
interaction. Domestic decisions to adopt market reforms allow nations to travel faster through the
endogenous growth path, and ultimately converge in the rates of output.36 Faced with a challenge
from a fast growing dissatisfied nation, and failing co-option, the dominant nation can still
preserve preponderance through alliances. By persuading medium and smaller nations to
“bandwagon” the dominant nation gains time to achieve support for the status quo from the
challenger. Such are short term solutions and may prove costly and untenable in the long-term
because the dominant nation is declining in power. Regardless or temporal delays, when a
dominant nation fails to incorporate challengers into the status quo, a transition may lead to
military challenges. The defender may have to wage war to preserve the status quo or face the
prospects that it will be replaced.
Growth is directly related to the development of cooperative relations in the international
system, and these in turn are linked to domestic regimes. At the domestic level, research shows
that economic development is tied to the transition to democracy, yet the mere presence of
democracy does not secure sustained growth. 37 In most economies that sustain growth, reversion
from democracy to authoritarian rule is infrequent. Indeed, in England, Germany, the United
States, and Japan the process of economic growth is tied to the development of democracy. In
Latin America and Asia, the most successful economies are becoming democracies.38 Given the
increase in the number of democracies, the international system should be far more stable in the
future as more and more nations coordinate their domestic regime types. Research on the
democratic peace supports this argument.39
There is, however, a potential drawback: democracies that fail to reach sustained growth.
India, a democracy for half a century and a budding great power, has thus far failed to achieve
sustained growth, and has not fully implemented a market economy.40 Furthermore, it is not a
fully cooperative and satisfied nation. Democracy by itself, therefore, does not guarantee
stability. Likewise, China is modernizing its economy, moving very fast into a market economy
but failing to develop democratic structures (though at the local level some democratic activity is
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present).41 The central government remains an well-entrenched autocracy. 42 If the economic
institutions continue to converge, but the political institutions remain at odds, the consequences
for cooperation are unclear. China, like India, may remain non-cooperative or move towards
neutrality without becoming cooperative. From a power transition perspective, coordination of
political and economic structures is the key to ensuring peace.
Power transition posits that nations sharing preferences are far less likely to engage in
conflict.43 For this reason it is not surprising that liberal democracies seldom engage in war.
Evidence now has emerged that nations with similar political systems—authoritarian and
democratic—do not wage war against each other. However, democracies wage war at the same
rate as authoritarian governments, but concentrate this activity against nations with different
regime types. Power transition’s explanation for the democratic peace thesis is that a successful
dominant nation imposes common preferences on its allies. When the defender is successful in
adjusting domestic political regimes within its alliance to one type, as the US has been, members
do not fight each other. Moreover, as such an aggregation becomes preponderant the probability
of war is reduced dramatically. Supporters of the status quo reinforce their economic growth
through trade benefits, fiscal stability, investments, technology transfer, labor mobility and
security. The democratic peace we have so effectively recorded is consistent with power
transition, but may be fragile. If democracies fail to adopt open economies (India) or if open
economies fail to become democracies (China), the tie between domestic regime types and peace
should unravel. Today, democratic and market economy principles held by the preponderant US
led coalition ensure the perpetuation of Pax Americana.
INTEGRATION
Power transition advocates economic and political integration among nations that support
the status quo, but warns against such advances with and among challengers. Political and
economic integration produces joint benefits in the long-term among status quo nations willing
to pursue a cooperative relationship. Moreover, integration favors the dominant nation because
the economic gains accrued by status quo major powers strengthens them. As economic and
security arrangements are formalized, as with the EU or NAFTA, relationships consistent with
the goals of the dominant nation are institutionalized, increasing the probability of the
preservation of established rules even beyond the period of dominance by the defender. The
democratic peace is related to this argument. In the case of integration, nations formalize their
cooperative postures. In the case of the democratic peace, they adopt conciliatory security
policies toward each other. In each case cooperation is driven by similar evaluations of the status
quo.
Integration tends to either follow peaceful power transitions or emerge after dramatic
reductions in the degree of conflict among contending parties. Integration of status quo nations
assures further reductions of instability because it creates institutional channels for the resolution
of policy differences.44 Advancing integration is beneficial to the dominant power because it
creates satisfaction, enhances the pool of resources in the alliance, and maintains systemic
stability. US support for the EU, and its participation in NAFTA, is completely consistent with
the interests of the dominant nation. By advancing integration among status quo nations, the
United States ensures consistent support for market economies, patent restrictions, financial
structures, and other forms of economic behavior, which advance the integrity of the
international status quo.
18
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 5 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://www.bepress.com/peps/vol5/iss3/1
DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1024
19
Consider the long-term implications of a unified EU. A strong Europe would provide
support for the very structures that have made the United States successful in the post-war era.
The United States consolidated its international political and economic position through the
recovery of Western Europe, as these nations became its primary trading partners. A strong
Europe meant that NATO was an effective fighting force, and that security did not depend
exclusively on troops and equipment supplied by the United States. Indeed, as their economies
recovered, the financial and logistical responsibilities have increasingly shifted to the Western
European nations themselves.45 Consistent with the policies initiated under the Marshall Plan, the
United States should continue to support integration. This includes the impending monetary
union in Europe, since a strong European currency would reinforce stability of that continent,
and thus the US-led international system. Adjustments to the dollar—the only international
currency at present—may follow, but both sides are likely to operate well within the rules
established by the current international status quo. A stable European currency resulting from
monetary union among Western European nations may reinforce satisfaction within the
international system. US support for this institution is critical to provide the international
monetary system with credibility A stable European monetary union would help cultivate
satisfaction for the status quo along the economic dimension, but could also generate economic
comfort if cooperation endures.
 Given our interest in integration, what are the consequences of further expansion of the
EU? Expansion by the EU reinforces the commitment of Western European nations to stability,
provided that satisfaction with the status quo is maintained. Challenges could come if Europe
were to renege on its commitments to NATO or if it were to adopt a different set of rules for
economic interactions. This is a very unlikely scenario because of the long-standing security
arrangements as well as the economic ties between the United States and the EU that are so
profitable for both. We anticipate that conflict along the economic dimension will grow as the
EU becomes a global economic contender, but that overall relations will remain cooperative,
anchored by security collaboration. The development of institutions like the OECD, GATT and
the WTO help ensure that economic disputes, even difficult ones, can be resolved through
negotiations. Integration and the institutionalization of cooperative solutions to dispute are
therefore useful tools in the advancement of the status quo’s stability.
There are additional gains from integration. Economic theory suggests that when the
factors of production are approximately equal across countries, increasing capital flows and trade
will generate larger economic rewards for partners. Indeed, after a devastating war, the Marshall
Plan and economic integration rekindled the economies of Europe.46 The early coal and steel
community was enlarged at the Treaty of Rome because the continental European nations
understood that a larger market gave them a competitive edge. However, economic integration
between nations with dramatically different factors of production will favor faster growth rates in
nations with lower production costs. Indeed, successful integration accelerates economic
convergence among nations with different production capabilities. Thus, the long term
expectation for NAFTA is that while the United States, Canada, and Mexico will grow, the
fastest growth rates should be enjoyed by Mexico, then Canada, and finally the United States.
Power transition suggests that enhancing economic convergence, while fostering behavior
congruent with those of the international status quo is a strategy that will ensure continued
stability.
Integration, nevertheless, is not a panacea. Conflict can be generated when challengers
pursue integration. Economic cooperation among dissatisfied countries enhances their
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capabilities, and these can be used to challenge the dominant nation and its coalition. 47 This was
the strategy adopted by the USSR during the Cold War. Although the Soviet Union could not
explicitly challenge the US at the global level by itself, it created a competing coalition. Even
though the Soviet-controlled COMECON fell short of its sponsor’s expectations and never
challenged the US-led European Union, COMECON economic institutions consolidated the hold
of the USSR over Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, we now know but should have known earlier
that centrally planned economies are not economically viable in the long-term. They are simply
not competitive with open economies.48 Yet, had COMECON survived, had the USSR and
managed to liberalize its economy with abandoning political centralization (as China has), and
had the Sino-Soviet split been amicably resolved, then the economic and political power of these
challengers may well have been far more difficult to overcome. Successful integration among
dissatisfied nations, therefore, can be a recipe for war.
Given its current preponderance in the power hierarchy, to enhance systemic stability the
United States can seek to increase integration among status quo nations. Yet, given the
prevailing common wisdom, it is tempting to disregard the international status quo and act as if
anarchy dominates relations among allies. Such actions by the dominant nation could destroy
trust and reduce allied commitment to the status quo, and eventually weaken the power base of
the US. The challenge for US policy is to be bold and forward-looking. Positive responses to
changing international dynamics include US support for the expansion of the EU to Eastern
Europe, the incorporation of Russia into NATO and the EU, the enlargement of NAFTA to
include Mercosur, and further commitment to APEC. Economic and political integration among
status quo nations generates not only a stable policy environment, but also reinforces the power
structure of the international system.
From the power transition perspective, reinforcing commitment to the status quo is the
most effective means to preserve the integrity of the international system. The original designer
of the status quo cannot forever be a dominant nation. The EU has shown that integration can
bring old enemies together by generating favorable returns because of economies of scale and
positive spillovers. Encouraging an old competitor, like Russia, to join the EU enhances
hierarchical stability. The same strategy of economic engagement and integration that succeeded
in Western Europe can reinforce Russia’s drift towards democracy and strengthen its
commitment to the status quo. Through integration, Pax Americana can continue unchallenged
well into the 21st century. 49 Through integration the international status quo designed by the
United States can last beyond its own dominance.
CONCLUSIONS
Power transition shows a very different structure for the world. It suggests that domestic
dynamics of economic expansion reshape the structures of the international arena.  It shows that
parity increases the probability that wars are waged. Political elites can take advantage of periods
of preponderance to establish strong common bonds with allies and eliminate tensions with
opponents. The use of economic instruments that facilitate trade, stabilize currencies, manage
labor mobility, and increase technological transfers are the tools with which dominant nations
can use to enhance support for the status quo. When such tools are applied effectively, as did the
United States following World War II, transitions are peaceful, and the periods that follow them
are increasingly stable. When, however, the dominant nation and its key allies fail to take
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advantage of temporary preponderance to establish workable relations with potential opponents,
as Great Britain did during Pax Britannica, then stability is challenged and war likely.
To preserve peace it is important to reconcile the preferences of competing nations.
Economic interactions can be used to generate the support needed to bring dissatisfied nations
towards the status quo. Much can be accomplished wit the elite of dominant nations pursues a
cooperative strategy.  While such strategies do not maximize the immediate economic interests
of the dominant power, they build the trust that is essential for an “internationalist” perspective.
The process of economic and political integration that is frequently vaulted for its economic
spillovers has more important security implications. Nations undergoing the process of economic
integration establish a cooperative relationship, eliminating the need to use conflict to resolve
disputes. As the record of Europe before and after World War II attests, the integration process
eliminates the need to rely on military power to ensure one’s safety against neighboring
countries. The additional payoff of integration is that as the creation of supra-national units
concentrates power, it also ensures that participants are preponderant over a larger set of
opponents.
Power transition suggests that peace is the result of convergence of preferences. Stability
is achieved when the dominant nation and its coalition partners persuade potential challengers to
support the status quo. Throughout the process, the dominant nation is torn between its interest
in preserving stability than in advancing common preferences. Long term stability comes from
building common preferences. Testimony to the primacy of stability over common preferences,
however, abounds. During the Cold War, US support for regional pro-American dictatorships
was driven by fear that the Soviets would step into the vacuum. Even when the Soviet Union was
collapsing, the United States did not actively support independence for the Baltic nations, and
did not favor the dissolution of the USSR into Russia and the former Soviet Republics. Stable
relations in the long term cannot simply rely on security in the short term. A successful
international status quo can only be preserved through flexibility in relations and through the
incorporation of new preferences advanced by nations that challenger the existing order. There is
evidence that even the most determined attempts to change the international hierarchy by force
are short lived. The implication of the “phoenix factor” is plain: major wars diminish the
capabilities of potential challengers in the short term. Yet nation defeated on the battlefield will
rise again within one generation and can challenge for supremacy again and again. Thus, it is not
through war that political leaders restructure relations in world politics. Major changes are
shaped by the economic and diplomatic policies implemented after war.
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ENDNOTES
                                                                
1 An extraordinary amount of new research has validated and extended the theory in the past two decades. The
original basic statement of the power transition perspective is found in A.F.K. Organski’s World Politics (1958),
with extensions to the nuclear era in the second edition (1968). The fundamental test is found in Organski and
Kugler’s The War Ledger (1980). For an overview of  recent work and extensions see Kugler and Lemke’s Parity
and War (1996).
2 Lemke (1993, 1995, 1996) and Lemke and Werner (1996).
3 Organski and Kugler (1980:19). See also Organski (1968).
4 The preceding should not be interpreted to mean that being powerful but not the dominant power automatically
means that a state will be dissatisfied. Furthermore, the act of growing more powerful, even more powerful than the
dominant country itself does not automatically mean that the growing state will be satisfied.  Were that the case,
power transition theory would be internally logically inconsistent, because it would then be impossible for an
overtaking by a dissatisfied state to occur.  Power transition theory would then logically preclude the necessary
condition for war from possibly occurring.  A pair of recent articles (de Soysa, Oneal and Park 1997, Gartzke 1998)
have misrepresented power transition theory by claiming that power or growth causes states to be satisfied with the
status quo.  Lemke and Reed (1998) point out the logical inconsistency associated with such claims, and
demonstrate by a Granger causality analysis that there is no statistical relationship between power level or growth in
power and evaluations of the status quo for all states over the 1816-1985 time period.  The logic and intuition of
Lemke and Reed’s argument is simple to comprehend.  Although it is clearly plausible to expect that growth or
power would be associated with being satisfied with how the international system operates, it is not necessarily the
case.  It could well be that the powerful or growing state became powerful or has experienced growth in spite of an
unfavorable international status quo or in the face of hostile opposition by the dominant state.  Nazi Germany in the
1930s and the Soviet Union of the 1950s experienced dramatic growth in power but within very hostile international
atmospheres.  Becoming more powerful made neither state satisfied with the status quo.  Although power and wealth
may be generally satisfying in some broad sense, they do not guarantee that a state will be satisfied with the status
quo.  In fact, it is possible to conceive of an international system in which most of the great powers will be
dissatisfied (in contrast to the shading in Figure 4).  Imagine a “Robin Hood” dominant power that reallocated from
the great powers, to the struggling Third World states.  In such a system the proportion of satisfied states would
increase as we moved lower in the international power pyramid but the support for such system would decrease as
the large powers are taxed without their consent.
5 For similar arguments about national growth from economics, see Solow (1962), Romer (1986), and Lucas (1988).
For contrasting arguments see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996).
6 Feng, Kugler and Zak (1999) show that politics may be a primary cause of countries falling into a low-income
poverty trap. Indeed, an expectation of political instability increases the likelihood of a poverty trap because it
adversely affects income and thus raises fertility. Similarly, governments with low political capacity will allocate
low levels of taxes to increasingly generate output from the public sector and preserve high levels of fertility, thus
allowing human capital to decrease over generations and causing reductions in future output.
7 For more detailed arguments about extraction of resources by governments and the relationship between this and
war, see Organski and Kugler (1980:chapter 2), Kugler and Domke (1986), and Ray and Vural (1986).
8 Unlike advocates of realism who argue that security considerations are paramount (reflecting “high” politics) while
economic considerations are secondary or “low” politics, power transition considers these as equivalent components.
The power transition approach argues that dissatisfied nations will compete on security and economic interactions,
attempting to foster competitive relationships despite the risk of war, while satisfied nations will approach similar
issues utilizing cooperative relationships, minimizing the risk of conflict. For example, economic and security
exchanges between Iran and the US are now shrouded in conflict as both utilize a competitive strategy with each
other, while relations between Canada and the United States are cooperative.
9 The literature on absolute and relative gains deals with similar issues. We loosely equate the notion of absolute
gains with cooperative relations because participants are willing to engage in mutually beneficial interactions even
when one side gains more than the other does. On the other hand, we relate relative gains with non-cooperative
relations because the participants enter into interactions only when they see a direct unilateral advantage for the
more powerful actor. For a discussion of this point see Grieco (1988), Powell (1991), Snidal (1991), Grieco, Powell,
and Snidal (1993), and Huntington (1993). Morrow (1997) argues that relative gains do not imply purely
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exclusionary behavior by showing that concern with relative gains does not prevent trade between rivals. Thus, our
continuum suggests the opposite of cooperative is non-cooperative behavior —not exclusion or pure animosity.
10 Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka (1985) elaborate this point to its extreme conclusion when they
argue that all economic interactions are cooperative while political interactions are conflictual.  They point out
correctly that during a sale, the consumer can choose to pay the asking price and take the desired product or walk
away with the money. In either case the outcome is cooperative. On the other hand, political interactions are
typically conflictual. When a police officer is giving a ticket to a speeder that passed you on the road, a sense of
relief follows because a dangerous individual is removed from the road. However, when a police officer stops you
for the same offense, the transaction is not a cordial one. Every excuse is used to avoid payment, and frequently the
parties seek judicial settlement. There is little cooperation when political rules—otherwise supported by third
parties—are imposed on us.
11 There is, as Tom Willett accurately points out, a time dimension to such interactions. Business practitioners may
compete over market share using competitive strategies—as did Apple and Microsoft over operating systems
following the introduction of personal computers (PC’s) into the marketplace—and later revert a cooperative
strategy—as reflected by Microsoft’s loan to Apple to retain competition in that market. One possibility is that
leaders select a competitive or cooperative strategy according to the situation. When threats to their market share are
more extreme and immediate, they respond with a more competitive strategy. As Alsharabati (1997) argues, when
power transitions are slower the dominant power has more time to deal with an emerging threat. In such
circumstances it can adopt a more cooperative behavior. The victim of a successful competitive strategy must either
discount his/her losses in the short term and agree to the new cooperative principles, or, more likely, he/she will
maintain the competitive strategy until the outcome is clear and time erased competition (as was the case in the
Apple-Microsoft dispute). It is further possible that elites mix competitive and cooperative strategies to maximize
their advantage. Such strategies while conceptually plausible would be detected in the long run nullifying the
advantage that could be gained from such mixed strategies
12 The distinction between complex interdependence and pursuit of national sovereignty has divided our field for
some time. On the complex interdependence side see Keohane and Nye (1977) and Keohane (1984). On the national
sovereignty side see Krasner (1976) and Huntington (1997). Ineffective understanding of this continuum also
divides practitioners who advocate an “internationalist” view and those who advocate a “national interest” fist
perspective (Organski 1990). Power transition incorporates these alternatives into a single perspective.
13 The defender, or dominant power, is satisfied by definition in the international status quo. The dominant power
defines the relations in the status quo by virtue of its preponderance.
14 Dissatisfied-Dissatisfied interactions mirror the Satisfied-Dissatisfied patterns. The exception is collusion among
dissatisfied nations to advance common goals. This possibility is rare and generally only applies to security matters.
Thus, it is excluded from this discussion for simplicity.
15 Adherence to a cooperative strategy does not resolve internal distribution problems. When such disputes fester
and cannot be resolved, partners are likely to move to a competitive strategy. Note for example that successful
companies that foster a cooperative relationship may over time diverge in aims because they cannot solve the
distribution problems. A good example is the ongoing debate between members of Arthur Andersen where the
Anderson Consultant group originally created from funds provided by Anderson because the former no longer agree
about the distribution of profits among partners and are seeking a quite public separation. Problems of internal
distribution when not resolved can move a relationship from cooperation to competition.
16 See Huntington (1993), Krasner (1976), and Waltz (1979).
17 See Snidal (1991), Grieco (1988), Grieco, Powell, and Snidal (1993), and Powell (1991).
18 This behavior produced a large literature concerned with “free riding” principles suggesting that Europeans
unduly took advantage of the United States by spending less for defense (Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher 1987).
Some authors even argued that the United States could be endangered by this principle since members of the
coalition would grow faster than the dominant nation that paid excessively for defense and would endanger the
dominant nation itself (Keohane 1984). From the perspective of power transition such concerns are misplaced as
even if an overtaking were created by such subsidies, the regime in place would continue as both nations would now
defend the status quo. This is the case of the EU and Japan who support the status quo and are not a threat to the US.
19 See Intriligator and Brito (1987) for a theoretical perspective on this issue. Military aid in the Middle East and
Latin America followed similar principles, as in Organski  (1990).
20 This is a mistake frequently made by analysts who profess to follow the precepts of Realism. Such insights derive
from the mistaken assumption of anarchy. From a realist perceptive Waltz (1979) typically argues that the only
deterrent to war is the fear of its consequences. Likewise, from a more liberal viewpoint Keohane (1986) still argues
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that the hegemon could be challenged by members of its own coalition who previously benefit from security and
economic transfers. Such arguments do not stand the test time. No long-term allies choose to fight simply because
they have the opportunity to do so (Kugler and Organski 1989a and Russett 1993). Instead long term-allied nations
reinforce each other and contribute to the preservation of common preferences, as they become stronger. For a
formal treatment of such results see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Abdollahian (1996), and Alsharabati
(1997).
21 See Huntington (1993).
22 See Kindelberger (1973).
23 Feng (1994)
24 See Hunt (1990).
25 See Kindelberger (1973).
26 See Cave and Jones (1977).
27 See Rogowski (1989).
28 Feng (1994).
29 Implications of security externalities are elaborated by Mansfield and Bronson (1997), Mansfield (1994), Gowa
(1983,1994), and Gowa and Mansfield (1993).
30 Soviet MIG’s for example relied on miniature tubes rather than integrated circuits because of the technological
restrictions imposed during the Cold War. Willkins (1998) shows that sanctions restricted technical trade more than
general trade. For alternate arguments see Pollins (1989a, 1989b) and Mansfield (1994). For assessment of sanctions
see Morgan and Schwebach (1997).
31 Given the size of China, India and Russia it is not possible for the United States to fundamentally alter their
growth trajectories through trade sanctions. Moreover sanctions are effective only when applied universally.
32 Recall that, Carter’s efforts to restrictions on oil equipment transfers required to build an oil pipeline from the
Soviet Union to Western Europe collapsed after sanctions were violated by EU members.
33 The reliability of launchers was increased dramatically. Ten failures were reported prior to the technological
transfer, while no failures related to guidance systems were reported afterwards. We note here the effects of security
considerations. The government has thwarted Hughes Electronics in its efforts to export satellite technology to
China.
34 Power transition and democratic peace advocates converge on the issue of satisfied, like-kind nations preserving
the peace. McNammara suggested three decades ago that high economic performance is associated with democracy.
In turn the large literature on the democratic peace shows that democracies seldom challenge each other. Thus the
common sense and empirical literature concur on the fact that economic growth accelerates democracy and that
democracy enhances intentional stability. Feng (1997), Russett (1993), Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995).
35 US leadership and funding created international financial institutions including the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBDR) later transformed into the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These institutions were established to stabilize
currencies and economies and to foster economic recovery and development following World War II.  The role of
each has evolved, but all still work to foster similarity in economic interests and stability in economic systems. After
Western Europe recovered, the focus of these organizations shifted to the developing world. Their objective has
always been to secure growth of membership in and compliance with the status quo.
36 See the discussion on the developmental path in Tammen et.al. (2000).
37 For a formal model demonstrating this result with empirical support, see Feng and Zak (1999).
38 Exceptions are found in the oil-producing nations such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait rank among the richest in per
capita income, where autocratic rule persists despite sustained economic growth. These discrepancies are the result
of luck, as the wealth of these nations is based on resource endowments rather than productivity of populations.
39 The literature supporting this claim is vast. For a sampling see Russett (1993), Ray (1995), Chan (1996), Rummel
(1997).
40 Indonesia has a relatively high per capita income and may be undergoing a process of democratic development.
The Philippines is another anomaly that has adopted democratic structures with a market economy but has yet to
produce sustained growth.
41 See Chen, Dietrich, and Feng 1999.
42 This is starting to change, as suggested by Buford-Efird (1999). In the long-run, increasing pressure from regional
governments in China is likely to enhance the pressure on the central government to liberalize its political system
along with its economic system.
43 See Lemke and Reed.
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44 For a broader discussion of this point see Keohane (1980) and Haas (1970).
45 For example, Europe has had to take more and more responsibility for NATO, both in terms of the provision of
forces and funding. Similarly, the trade balance terms of exports, has shifted more Europe’s favor, as suggested by
Kugler and Organski (1989a).
46 A substantive argument revolves around the issue of whether integration is most effective among advanced
nations, among nations that can complement each other’s production functions, or among nations that are very
underdeveloped and can gain market share. The integration of Europe suggests that complementary economies
prompt integration among equals. However, EU has shown by the introduction of Spain, Portugal and Greece that
economic parity is not a prerequisite for integration. Power transition suggests that integration can be successful at
several levels depending on the political attitudes towards the status quo by partners that drive this effort.
47 Stone (1995) shows that within CMEA patterns of interdependence evolved that were very similar to those noted
by Keohane and Nye (1977) in the western context.
48 See Organski and Kugler (1980).
49 Integration enhances stability when the status quo is reinforced and threatens stability when opponents of the
status quo coalesce around a challenger. In the dynamics of power transition, support by the status quo members of
the hierarchy is essential for stability. A dominant nation has the opportunity to establish rules of behavior during
periods of preponderance, and given the growth patterns, can preserve such rules by advancing economic and
political integration. Under parity opportunities to affect acceptance of the status quo shift from the dominant nation
to the challenger, who can now choose to participate in integration efforts. If differences remain and interactions are
minimal, the structural conditions for conflict due to an overtaking by a dissatisfied nation materialize. The
dominant nation can insure long term stability by pursuing proactive policy favoring economic engagement and
integration during periods of preponderance. Such foreign policy actions are consistent with US policy in Europe
regarding the EU, the economic and political support of Russia following the collapse of the USSR, and economic
engagement of China. This is not only wise policy, but the only guarantee for stability in the nuclear age.
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